As a matter of general principle, when a statute vests a power or function in an identified person, such as “the Commissioner” or “the Board”, the identified person or entity – and no one else – should exercise the power or function (see, e.g. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Brent [1956] SCR 318; Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] […] Read more

This is an extract from my recent paper on bias (available here): In this section, I will draw a contrast between an Australian decision and one from Canada, again to support my proposition that the law relating to bias is best understood in terms of temporal and spatial proximity. At the centre of the tale […] Read more

This is an extract from my recent paper on bias (available here):   I will consider three Canadian decisions in this section. They each relate to the prior relationship between a decision-maker and a party to a matter. The issue in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board[1] was the perceived lack of […] Read more

In my factum for the Telus case (noted here), I discussed two ways in which courts can engage in dynamic statutory interpretation. I represented the Canadian Telecommunications Association. I thought it might be helpful to reproduce the relevant portions of the factum here. Commonwealth courts manage the difficult task of applying statutory provisions to changing […] Read more